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Abstract
The analysis in hand is discussing how 
certain relevant agencies collaborate 
in the issue of Maritime Domain 
Awareness (MDA) in order to enhance 
safety and security in the (maritime) 
space of Ghana in particular and 
the Gulf of Guinea in general. The 
purpose was to investigate Ghana’s 
MDA capabilities, ascertain the current 
technical and operational capacity and 
to bring to the fore major challenges 
that prevent effective collaboration 
between those agencies, while 
identifying workable solutions. This 
research effort further identified the 
actions/initiatives required to improve 
the conduct of maritime safety and/
or security operations by the law 
enforcement agencies in the country 
under discussion. Conclusively worth 
highlighting is that it is necessary to 
increase Ghana’s maritime security 
capacity by appropriately taking 
advantage of the current MDA available 
tools within Ghana’s maritime related 
agencies and optimize performance 
by establishing a framework of special 
cooperation and standard operating 
procedures applicable to all relevant 
stakeholders. 
Introduction
The Gulf of Guinea (GoG) is a rather 
busy shipping area; it connects an 
extended number of countries and also 
provides a major source of revenue 
for oil producing countries along its 
coastline. It is located partly in the 
North and partly in the South Atlantic 
Ocean, along the Western and Central 
African coasts with 17 coastal and 2 
island states, as illustrated in      Figure 
1. The heavy maritime traffic within the 
GoG region is associated with safety, 
security and environmental challenges 
to the coastal and island nations. 
With an increasing number of vessels 
operating in the GoG, regulatory 
and law enforcement agencies are 
under pressure to mitigate pressing 
problems such as Illegal, Unreported, 
Unregulated (IUU) fishing, piracy and 
armed robbery as well as the trafficking 
of drugs and people, and transport of 
illegal goods by sea (Hoyle, 2015). The 
Republic of Ghana, being the gateway 
to West Africa and a new entrant in 
the production of oil in commercial 
quantities, has a vested interest in the 
developments within the region. As 
a result, there is an important role to 
play in addressing maritime safety and 
security issues in the GoG.
Ghana is a littoral State located in 
West Africa. The country shares a 
border with Togo to the East, Cote 
d’Ivoire to the West, Burkina Faso to 
the North and the GoG to the South. 
Its coastline of 300 nautical miles (nm) 
is stretching from Aflao on the East to 
New Town on the West. Because of its 
diverse maritime interests, Ghana has 
established 12nm of Territorial Waters, 
followed by 12nm of Contiguous 
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Zone, resulting in a 200nm Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) (CIA, 2018) 
and 350nm Continental Shelf (Daily 
Graphic, 2018), in full accordance with 
provision of UNCLOS , as depicted in 
Figure 2. Shipping and sea-borne trade 
are vital to the economic development 
of the country with nearly 90% of both 
imports and exports carried through 
the sea lines of communication (Shou, 
2017).
The territorial waters of Ghana abound 
in enormous natural resources, 
including fisheries, minerals and 
hydrocarbon deposits. Moreover, 
Ghana has become a major maritime 
trading hub for West Africa in recent 
years (GPHA, 2015). It is indicative 
that since 2010, there has been the 
issue of oil production in commercial 
quantities, with several explorations 
still on-going in the western part of 
the EEZ. The protection of the oil 
installations and vessels engaged 
in the vibrant fishing industry as well 
as tourism and other commercial 
activities have created the need for 
constant monitoring of the maritime 
area.
This research effort, among other 
things, sought answers to what 
Ghana’s policies and priorities on 
MDA are, what Ghana’s current MDA 
capabilities and assessments are, 
what challenges the various maritime 
stakeholders face in collaboration and 
information sharing, whether adequate 
training has been given to operators of 
the various MDA tools, and how the 
situation could be improved.
3. Ghana’s Maritime Safety 
and Security Threats
Ghana’s maritime domain has changed 
significantly in the last decade. The 
discovery of hydrocarbon deposits 
has created a different economic 
environment and has become the 
engine of national progress. Ghana 
like any other GoG country, is faced 
with increasing maritime safety and 
security threats, evident among them 
being piracy (Dalaklis, 2012). The 
major threats mostly identified in the 
maritime domain of Ghana include the 
following:
Environmental. The effect on 
the environment of the activities 
associated with oil production (oil 
pollution), illegal discharges from ships 
as well as illegal dumping is enormous 
and the necessary attention must be 
given. Pollution of the environment by 
the exploration/drilling of oil is mainly 
in the form of oil spillage into the sea, 
accidental discharges at sea and the 
accidental spill process of the oil. 
Finally, the dumping of toxic waste 
must be included in the complete 
environmental protection equation.
Fisheries. The fishing industry in 
Ghana is threatened with extinction 
as a result of over-fishing and IUU. 
Industrial fishing vessels are not 
allowed to fish in the Inshore Exclusive 
Zone, which corresponds to areas from 
the coastline to 6nm seaward or below 
30m depth, while artisanal fishing 
canoes are permitted to fish within 
those areas. However, many industrial 
fishing vessels simply defy this 
provision, resulting in the depletion of 
the fish resources.  Often, IUU fishing 
fleets illegally scoop-up hundreds of 
millions of dollars’ worth of fish from 
Ghanaian waters, a basic reason why 
import restrictions were imposed on 
Ghana’s fisheries products in 2012 
and 2013 by the European Union (EU) 
(MOFAD, 2014).
Illegal Bunkering/Crude Oil Theft. 
Illegal bunkering includes the purchase 
of illegally acquired or refined oil 
products mostly at cheaper rates. It 
is typically acquired from stolen oil 
and the destruction of oil pipelines 
with criminal intent for mischief or for 
Figure 2: Ghana’s maritime boundary
Source: Created by authors, as a modification from Ghanaweb.com
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MARITIME SECURITY
monetary gains. It also involves the 
diversion of crude and refined products 
by unauthorized persons at sea. When 
companies continue to patronise these 
cheap products, illegal bunkering has 
the tendency to increase criminal 
activities like piracy and armed robbery 
at sea (Akah and Dalaklis, 2017).  It is 
against this backdrop that MT Mammy 
Mary and MT Metrix 1 were both 
arrested by the Ghanaian Navy when 
they illegally traded oil consignment 
about 5nm from Tema Harbour on 14 
April 2018 (Ocloo, 2018).
Piracy/Robbery at Sea. Piracy and 
robbery at sea are set to be on the 
rise in the GoG region at an alarming 
rate (IMB, 2018), surpassing that in 
the Horn of Africa. These pirates and 
robbers usually target ships’ crews, 
cargo and other valuables. The first 
quarter of 2018 saw a string of 22 
piratical attacks in the GoG region, 
in the maritime domains of Ghana 
(1 hijacked), Benin (2 hijacked) and 
Nigeria (1 hijacked), with very high 
success rates (IMB, 2018). The 
number of incidences surpassed 
those from all other regions in the first 
quarter of 2018.
Trafficking. Ghana in 2016 was 
identified among the major cocaine 
transit points, with about 61% being 
transported out of the country by sea 
(UNODC, 2016). Drug trafficking, a 
transnational crime, has an impact on 
national security and is also directly 
related to other types of organised 
crime such as money laundering and 
terrorism. Moreover, it has the potential 
to corrupt state institutions and to 
affect the stability of state systems and 
society. Also, humans and weapons 
may be trafficked through Ghanaian 
waters if criminals find that these 
waters are not properly secured. 
2. The Yaoundé Code of 
Conduct
The Code of Conduct concerning the 
repression of piracy, armed robbery 
against ships and illicit maritime 
activity in West and Central Africa, 
also widely known as the Yaoundé 
Code of Conduct, was adopted at the 
Yaoundé summit in Cameroon on 25 
June 2013. This regional framework is 
an initiative of Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS), 
Economic Community of Central 
African States (ECCAS), the Gulf of 
Guinea Commission (GGC) and the 
Maritime Organisation of West and 
Central Africa (MOWCA), and contains 
a comprehensive strategy that seeks 
to counter maritime threats within the 
GoG region (IMO, 2013). 
This Code of Conduct brings signatory 
states together to take appropriate 
measures to combat maritime threats, 
in accordance with international 
standards, and also commit to 
maritime information sharing among 
states. It is of interest to note that 
the leading pillar of the strategy is 
interoperability between stakeholders 
to gather timely intelligence and share 
it among themselves at national or 
international levels. Through that, the 
various countries have developed and 
operationalized Maritime Operation 
Centre (MOC) for their navies and/or 
coast guards, to facilitate information 
sharing.
For effective monitoring and 
enforcement capabilities, the Inter-
Regional Coordination Centre (ICC) 
was established at the strategic level 
to implement the regional integrated 
strategy for maritime safety and 
security, contained in the Yaoundé 
Code of Conduct. At the 
sub-regional level, there 
is the establishment of 
the Regional Maritime 
Security Centre 
for Central Africa 
(CRESMAC), located in 
Pointe-Noire, Republic 
of the Congo for the 
ECCAS region. In 
addition, the Regional 
Maritime Security 
Centre for West Africa 
(CRESMAO), located 
in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire 
serves the ECOWAS region. The multi-
national level has a zonal approach 
system, established to coordinate 
activities within the zones known as 
Multi-National Maritime Coordination 
Centres (MMCC). These centres 
group states together, to pursue 
common maritime security interests. 
The national level, represented by 
MOCs of the various representing 
countries, will be required to contribute 
immensely and work towards the 
realisation of the overall aim of the 
integrated maritime strategy.
3. Agencies Concerned with 
Issues of MDA in Ghana
MDA involves the interaction between 
several maritime agencies confronted 
with the challenge of ensuring safety 
and security as well as clean and 
environmentally friendly seas (Bueger, 
2015). It is interesting to note that each 
one of these agencies has its specific 
mandate, internal bureaucracy and 
organisational culture. The problems 
encountered with internal red-tape 
are often translated into the national 
level. The maritime stakeholders 
are cross-sectoral in nature. The 
agencies include the Ghana Maritime 
Authority (GMA), the law enforcement 
agencies (Navy, Police) and other 
regulatory agencies (Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), Monitoring, 
Control and Surveillance (MCS) unit 
of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture 
(MOFAD), Ghana Ports and Harbours 
Authority (GPHA), National Security 
Figure 3: Gulf of Guinea Information Sharing Architecture
Source: Created by the authors
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Coordinating Council (NSCC), 
National Disaster Management 
Organisation (NADMO) and Narcotics 
Control Board (NACOB)).
4. Initiatives Contributing to 
MDA in Ghana
Piratical attacks (including armed 
robbery at sea) have been increasing 
in the GoG region at an alarming rate 
since 2007, with incidences exceeding 
a quarter of worldwide reported attacks. 
Maritime insecurity in the region 
affects the transport of about 5 million 
tons of oil per day, which is more than 
half of Africa’s total production per day 
and about 30% of the United States 
of America’s oil imports (Vircoulon 
and Tournier, 2014). To address the 
situation, there have been a series 
of political level initiatives by member 
states of the region to implement a 
regional strategy for the safety and 
security of the maritime domain of 
both West and Central Africa. For 
Ghana, of particular interest was 
the operationalisation of a Vessel 
Traffic Monitoring Information System 
(VTMIS). The main components of the 
VTMIS in Ghana are Eight (8) Remote 
Sensor Sites (RSS) located along the 
coast of Ghana from East near Togo to 
West near Cote d’Ivoire (GMA, 2014), 
with all associated infrastructures 
explained below:
Eight (8) Remote Sensor Sites (RSS) 
located along the coast of Ghana from 
East near Togo to West near Cote 
d’Ivoire. The RSS are equipped with 
radio communication towers, radars, 
Automatic Identification System (AIS) 
receivers, as well as Closed Circuit 
Television (CCTV) for detecting and 
identifying ships and fast moving 
boats. The sites are equipped 
with marine radio communication 
equipment i.e. MF/HF and VHF, 
which complies with the International 
Maritime Organisation (IMO) standard 
provisions for Global Maritime Safety 
and Distress Systems (GMDSS) 
and Long Range Identification and 
Tracking (LRIT) to enable regular 
receipt of ship reports.
Three (3) Remote Base Stations for 
inland waterways located along the 
River Volta.
Three (3) Area Control Centres for the 
West, Central and East sectors, and 
one (1) National Control Centre sited 
in Accra.
There are provisions to further equip 
the RSS with meteorological and 
hydrological sensors. When that 
equipment are integrated in the 
system, it will provide local weather 
data from the respective sites to the 
Control Centres for broadcasting.
The data gathered from the Remote 
Sites is transmitted to the Control 
Centres. The VTMIS operators are 
then able to display that vessel traffic 
information on screens. 
The Ghanaian Navy has established 
its VTMIS control station at the 
headquarters in Accra, with two (2) 
other monitoring stations in Tema 
and Takoradi respectively. The Tema 
port which is operated by GPHA, 
NSCC, MCS and NACOB also have 
monitoring stations to monitor vessel 
traffic. In addition, there are provisions 
for Monitoring Station facilities to be 
implemented in the Takoradi port. The 
system is yet to be reconfigured for 
Customs, Immigration and the Marine 
Police; this will be performed after they 
have all relocated to their new offices 
in various locations. It is of interest to 
note that a control centre can utilize 
all the functionalities of the VTMIS 
equipment, while monitoring centres 
have limited use of functionalities like 
flagging a vessel of interest.
5. Ghana’s Maritime 
Operations Centres
For the Ghanaian Navy to perform 
its functions well, surveillance and 
intelligence gathering is pivotal. For 
that reason, the US Navy in various 
forms assisted the Ghanaian Navy to 
set up three (3) Maritime Operation 
Centres (MOCs). There is a main 
national MOC located in Accra. There 
are also the East MOC in Tema and 
West MOC in Takoradi. Plans are in 
place for two (2) additional MOCs 
to be established in locations near 
the borders to the East and West. 
With the VTMIS framework, the 
national MOC has a “control centre” 
status, while the others are only 
monitoring centres. The MOCs are 
further equipped with the “SeaVision” 
and “Time Zero” Coastal Monitoring 
Systems, provided by the US Navy. 
“SeaVision” is a surveillance system 
that was specifically developed for the 
US Navy and allied partner nations 
to coordinate and track vessels of 
interest around the world. “Time 
Zero” coastal monitoring system is a 
maritime surveillance solution that is 
optimally configured for the coastal 
surveillance of Ghana.
6. Vessel Monitoring Systems 
(VMS)
To ensure food security and sustain 
the socio-economic development of 
the country, the MCS department of 
MOFAD operates a Vessel Monitoring 
System (VMS) to control fishing vessel 
activities for the protection of Ghana’s 
fishing stock. The use of this VMS 
is intended to curb the problem of 
overfishing, so that Ghana’s fishing 
stock will not be woefully depleted. 
A VMS is usually employed by 
fisheries regulatory authorities for the 
monitoring of position, course and 
speed, including time at position, of 
registered fishing vessels (Interpol, 
2014). Unlike AIS, VMS data is 
limited to the government agency 
that installed it. All industrial fishing 
trawlers in Ghana are mandated by 
law to install VMS transmitters on-
board. With that provision, the MCS 
is able to monitor the activities of the 
fishing fleet and query any suspicious 
activity the vessels may engage in. 
The vessels’ details are transmitted 
even 72 hours after the transmitter is 
tampered or destroyed by criminals at 
sea so that authorities will be able to 
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track the vessel in all circumstances.
7. Challenges of 
Collaboration for MDA in 
Ghana
Ghana acknowledges the importance 
of MDA in its activities; in response, 
there is equipment operated by various 
maritime agencies to enhance MDA 
capabilities in its waters. However, 
there is no formally documented 
Policy on this issue. It was identified 
that the lack of a comprehensive 
and clear Maritime Strategy seems 
to prevent agencies from effectively 
cooperating.  Without a maritime 
strategy, which should outline the 
roles and responsibilities of GMA 
and other maritime agencies, there 
is no guidance for these agencies, 
so cooperating with other parties/
stakeholders is not mandatory to 
them. It is of interest to note that 
during the current research effort, it 
was identified that the various systems 
supporting information collection 
and handling are not interoperable 
because they were purchased from 
different manufacturers and for 
purposes independent of each other.
It was also identified that the coastal 
communities and Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) concerned 
with maritime activities have very 
little or even no knowledge about 
MDA. However, every activity that 
happens at sea spans from land. If 
the coastal communities and local 
fisher associations are effectively 
involved in sharing vital information, 
intelligence can be gained about illicit 
maritime activities, like armed robbery 
and piracy; this is essential in order to 
intervenes even before these criminals 
proceed toward the sea.
Unfortunately, Ghana does not 
prioritize the maritime environment 
as key to economic prosperity. On 
the positive side, the government of 
Ghana acknowledges the importance 
of transportation in supporting the 
productive sector of the economy. 
Because of that, an Integrated 
Transport Plan for Ghana was 
developed in 2011. The plan, which 
was hoped to inform the budgetary 
allocation of government for the 
entire transport sector, effectively 
outlines policies for air, rail, road, 
urban, motorised and intermediate 
forms of transport. Strangely enough, 
however, the plan barely touched on 
maritime transport even though it is 
recognized that plans are not legally 
binding on agencies. However, the 
significance of maritime transport for 
the development and prosperity of 
Ghana was emphatically recognised.  
GMA admits shortages in its regulatory 
capacity as well as insufficient 
financial resources. There is also a 
shortage of local skills and capacity in 
the administration and management 
of the maritime sector that suggests 
the tendency to depend on foreign 
technical and financial support. The 
Ghanaian government admits that 
the new oil and gas discovery poses 
several challenges for the maritime 
transport sub-sector. It has, therefore, 
directed the GMA to develop regulations 
and enforcement mechanisms and 
procedures in good time. However, 
whilst GMA is already mandated to 
coordinate these activities, it faces 
additional challenges caused by the 
multi-agency environment in which 
maritime regulation is developed and 
enforced.
It was further identified that apart 
from diverse national interests 
spearheading collaboration through 
exercises and combined training 
during multinational initiatives, Ghana 
maritime stakeholders on their own 
do not organise any form of activity 
that enhances cooperation. To say the 
least, it is upsetting for these agencies, 
to allow any external actor to bring 
them together instead of initiating 
collaborative efforts themselves. It is 
only Exercise Obangame, intended 
for cooperation among countries 
in the GoG, which brings maritime 
stakeholders in Ghana together for a 
combined exercise. The GMA should 
institute an “internal programme” 
that helps in exercising the various 
surveillance systems for enhanced 
interoperability.
Also, the current contractual clauses 
are not favourable to the continuity 
of operations of the surveillance 
systems. Most of the contractual 
agreements require the systems to 
be remotely configured after minor 
breakdowns, and an expert to be flown 
in from abroad to fix major problems. 
Constant monitoring of activities at sea 
will be adversely affected when there 
is any type of breakdown that takes 
days or extended number of hours to 
be rectified. If there is a delay in travel 
arrangements or internet connection 
problems, the case will even be 
worsened.
Conclusion
Shipping activities within the GoG, 
and especially the maritime space of 
Ghana have increased significantly 
since 2007, when Ghana started to 
produce oil and gas in commercial 
quantities. Other reasons include 
expanded fishing activities, as well as 
the fact that Ghanaian ports of Tema 
and Takoradi serve as important transit 
hubs for neighbouring land-locked 
countries, especially Burkina Faso. 
As a matter of fact, there have been 
commensurate safety and security 
issues within the maritime domain of 
Ghana. To help in the surveillance 
of the maritime space and enforce 
maritime laws, various maritime 
agencies in Ghana operate different 
and unfortunately not integrated 
maritime surveillance systems. 
This research effort was conducted 
in order to investigate the Ghanaian 
MDA capabilities and to identify 
the challenges in collaboration 
between these maritime agencies, 
policies and priorities on MDA, 
current MDA capabilities, also to pin-
point surveillance operator training 
requirements and finally, to suggest 
ways of improvement. However, this 
study was limited to maritime surface 
surveillance alone; a thorough study is 
further recommended encompassing 
aviation, as well as under-water 
activities in order to holistically mitigate 
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safety and security problems in the 
maritime space of Ghana. 
The Yaoundé Code of Conduct is a 
regional initiative from ECOWAS and 
ECCAS to help curb piracy and armed 
robbery against ships plying the route 
within the GoG region. The Code 
entreats interoperability between 
maritime stakeholders and effective 
sharing of maritime information. This 
regional aim cannot be realised if 
similar collaboration is not effective 
at the national level. The surveillance 
systems employed in Ghana have all 
the needed tools, including coastal 
radars, cameras, AIS receivers and 
LRIT embedded for effective monitoring 
of the maritime environment. However, 
the major maritime agencies like 
GMA, the Ghanaian Navy and MCS 
unit of MOFAD operate independent 
surveillance systems to monitor their 
various areas of interest. Therefore, 
the issue of “interoperability” and 
promoting cooperation, even via a 
“top-down” approach enforced by a 
national policy/guideline document are 
clearly standing out as priorities.
There is the perception that 
collaboration between these maritime 
agencies is effective. However, 
case studies reviewed indicate lack 
of effective cooperation between 
the agencies due to the absence 
of a national maritime policy. Even 
combined maritime exercises that 
bring the agencies together, like 
Exercise Obangame Express, are 
spearheaded by external actors/
interests. An all-encompassing 
maritime policy will document clear-
cut roles for the maritime agencies, 
with the idea of achieving the national 
objective.
During the overall Master Thesis 
effort, questionnaires were 
administered to various maritime 
agencies and the responses were 
duly analysed. The observations 
and findings have been presented 
in line with the research objectives. 
The findings were summarized and 
necessary conclusions drawn. It was 
deduced that Ghana has a satisfying 
level of MDA capabilities that can 
help to deal with safety and security 
threats in its maritime domain. That 
notwithstanding, there is certain room 
for improvement. 
In any case, technology is just a 
tool to enhance maritime safety 
and security, but a good level of 
performance will not be achieved until 
authorities take the necessary action 
to show commitment and willingness 
to document policies and procedures 
that can help harness the potential of 
technology. If the suggested remedial 
actions provided are implemented, 
most importantly when a national 
maritime policy is documented and 
sanctioned by the legislature, all the 
maritime stakeholders will be bound 
by law to adhere to the provisions of 
that document. They will be obliged 
to swiftly collaborate and ensure a 
collective effort to enhance maritime 
safety and security.
Recommendations
Ghana, as a littoral country, needs 
an all-encompassing Maritime 
Strategy, with an MDA policy clearly 
described in that document. This 
can be done when risk assessment 
is carried out to ascertain the best 
plan of action for each anticipated 
threat, with the corresponding roles 
of various maritime agencies in each 
plan of action clearly stipulated. It 
is recommended that authorities 
expedite action in developing and 
documenting strategies for effective 
MDA.
Once this strategy is approved and 
adopted, agencies will need to follow 
the associated strategic directives 
and work together to formulate 
implementation plans through 
harmonized procedures, policies, 
and Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOPs) that would be in line with the 
strategy. When that is accomplished, 
Interagency Working Groups could 
be assembled to devise Interagency 
MOCs, joint task forces and other 
groups to work in a harmonized 
manner to tackle maritime challenges. 
No single agency can achieve success 
in the domains of maritime safety and 
security alone.
One way to achieve inter-agency 
cooperation is to establish political 
or legislative top-down inter-agency 
directional approach to maritime 
issues. However, it becomes 
cumbersome if every issue is handled 
this way, and is subject to whim or 
politics in terms of which main issue 
is most important. A better way is to 
get all agencies together and outline 
a comprehensive list of national 
concerns, then work together to agree 
on how to address them, with required 
resources clearly allocated. Subject-
matter expert exchanges and joint 
training are helpful in understanding 
the structure and workings of other 
agencies. In this case, the maritime 
agencies could agree to a framework 
outlining the biggest threats, key 
shortfalls in addressing those threats 
and available resources to address 
them.
Prioritizing maritime issues within 
government policies is also 
recommended. One of the most 
effective measures maritime agencies 
can take is to make sure that policy 
decision makers understand the 
importance of maritime safety and 
security to the greater economy of 
Ghana and the impact on the average 
Ghanaian. In that stead, “maritime 
oriented” seminars specifically 
designed for the attendance of 
politicians and government officials 
are of high urgency and importance. 
It is typical to focus more on land-
based priorities because those tend 
to be more pressing and affect the 
day-to-day lives of citizens. Piracy, oil 
spills, illegal fishing and other maritime 
issues have huge negative impacts, 
but may not have direct impact on 
the average citizen. It is, however, the 
responsibility of the maritime agencies 
to communicate to government 
overseers and citizens the role that 
MDA and the maritime environment 
play in their economic well-being. 
Without this, the agencies will be 
acting in isolation and will never get 
the necessary resources to address 
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will help avoid misunderstandings 
between agencies and possibly reduce 
response time of Maritime Interdiction 
Operations (MIO) when the need be. 
A joint national maritime operations 
centre, that mimics the Maritime 
Multinational Coordinating Centre 
of the GoG information sharing 
architecture, should also be 
established. This centre can be 
staffed with representatives from 
all maritime agencies, and through 
these representatives, information 
sharing among the agencies could 
be enhanced. Staff who work at this 
centre can be posted to the MMCC and 
CRESMAO in rotation. The experience 
of the staff in the national centre will 
be beneficial when such persons are 
employed at the sub-regional and 
regional maritime centres. 
Furthermore, it is recommended 
that certain contractual clauses 
are reviewed to favour continuity of 
operations of the surveillance systems. 
This stems from the fact that most of 
the agreements require the systems 
to be remotely configured after minor 
breakdowns, and an expert flown in 
from abroad to fix major problems. 
Instead, this arrangement could be 
changed for locals to be trained, and 
equipped with the proficiency to work 
effectively on those systems to fix any 
problem that develops on them.
Finally, another important issue for 
consideration is that, there could also 
be a network with fisher associations, 
fishing communities and association 
of fishing canoe owners created, so 
that they can report any illegal activity 
they sight at sea (Human Intelligence 
– HUMINT). Arrangements could 
be made with telecom companies 
to provide a dialling short code for 
easy reporting. This network could 
also be complemented by certain 
incentives: for example, the maritime 
agencies could provide life jackets or 
marine radios as reward for those who 
swiftly report incidents with malicious 
intents. With this arrangement, any 
illicit activity that goes unnoticed by 
the surveillance systems could be 
identified once sighted by the fishing 
canoe operators.
the problems. 
It is further recommended that 
surveillance operators are trained 
on information technology and cyber 
security. There is the need to ensure 
that people with criminal intent do not 
tamper with the information exchange 
within the surveillance systems. It is a 
fact that system manufacturers have 
certain security features in place. 
Nonetheless, operators should be 
trained to identify spurious activities 
or any tempering with the systems, 
and be able to effect repairs in order 
to ensure system integrity for effective 
surveillance.
It is strongly recommended to conduct 
regular multi-agency exercises and 
drills in order to enhance multi-agency 
cooperation. Effective decision making 
is based on accurate information, 
transmitted in good time. Exercises 
together will go a long way to improve 
timely information sharing, and reduce 
agencies’ response time to incidents. 
This could mitigate the negative 
effects of safety or security issues 
in the maritime space of Ghana. It 
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